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Research summary: Pre-entry industry experience is a central construct in the founding team
literature. Research on prior shared experience (PSE) emphasizes that founding teams face
challenges integrating and acting on independent experiences, so PSE should be beneficial for new
venture performance. Existing studies, however, typically study PSE in blunt terms, expecting that
more is better. Instrumental variable analyses of a unique sample of 344 commercial banks founded
in four U.S. states between 1996 and 2006 showed that industry-specific PSE may be more or
less beneficial, depending on several founding team characteristics. Our findings provide nuance
and caution to the narrative that PSE is always beneficial. Under some circumstances, firms with
founding team PSE may be no better off than those without founding team PSE, suggesting more
research is necessary to understand when and why founding team experience matters to new firms.
Managerial summary: Pre-entry experience of founding teams affects new firm performance, but
is hard for founders to leverage separately gained experience. Knowledge moves more readily
if sets of managers leave together to start a new firm. But, it may be simplistic to conclude that
prior shared experience (PSE) is always good, or better than the sum of independent experiences.
In a set of banks founded in four U.S. states between 1996 and 2006, we find that PSE is not
necessarily a direct pathway to better bank performance. Characteristics of the PSE, such as the
part of industry the former and new banks operate in, can lower its benefit. We also found that
the benefits of PSE erode as the entire founding team develops shared history after startup. Our
findings have implications for entrepreneurs, investors, and policy-makers. Copyright © 2015
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Founding teams greatly influence new firms’
initial strategies, structures, actions, and ultimately,
performance (Beckman, 2006; Eisenhardt and
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Schoonhoven, 1990; Roure and Keeley, 1990).
As such, researchers have become increasingly
interested in founding team characteristics to better
understand why new firms perform differently
(Delmar and Shane, 2006). One characteristic
affecting new firm success is knowledge inherited
via founding team members’ prior industry expe-
rience (Agarwal et al., 2004; Bamford, Dean, and
McDougall, 2000; Beckman and Burton, 2008;
Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, and Woo, 1994; Klepper
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and Sleeper, 2005). For new ventures that have
limited resources, prefounding industry experience
is a source of human capital (Helfat and Lieber-
man, 2002), and is a key criterion stakeholders
consider before funding (Delmar and Shane, 2006;
Shepherd, 1999).
While some researchers argue that individuals
can readily transfer knowledge gained from prior
experience to new firms (Burton, Sorensen, and
Beckman, 2002; Cooper et al., 1994), others ques-
tion that possibility (Ganco, 2013; Wezel, Cat-
tani, and Pennings, 2006), perhaps because extant
studies typically examine the presence or absence
of such experience, or simply look at additive
amounts of such experience. The emphasis is on
the possession of experience, not the configura-
tion of the experience among team members, and
thus, ignores whether experience is relevant and
exploitable (Ganco, 2013).
A contrasting approach focuses on whether prior
experience is shared. Prior shared experience (PSE)
means that some or all of the founding team mem-
bers worked together before they founded their new
venture. Shared experience may be distinct from
independent experience in that groups of employ-
ees that move together may be better able to transfer
knowledge and routines to new firms (Wezel et al.,
2006). Joint work history has been associated with
more rapid delivery of products to markets (Beck-
man, 2006) and higher performance (Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven, 1990). This stream of research,
though valuable, has implicitly assumed that PSE is
always beneficial, themore the better, despite mixed
findings or indications of no relationship in some
studies (Roure and Keeley, 1990).
More research is needed to develop a better
conceptualization of founding team characteristics
and to offer insights to stakeholders interested in
predicting new venture outcomes. Specifically,
research must clarify when PSE improves per-
formance and when it does not by answering
several questions. For instance, do the number
of team members having shared history, or how
long they have shared experience, matter? Do
new firms benefit equally from short-duration or
long-duration PSE? Likewise, could differences
between the context of the prior experience and
the new organization affect the utility of the shared
experience (Rousseau and Fried, 2001)? Finally,
does PSE ever fail to provide advantages over
independently acquired experience? To answer
these questions, we examine founding team PSE
and explore whether PSE characteristics modify
performance benefits.
We develop hypotheses regarding PSE qualities
and associated benefits (Cannon-Bowers, Salas,
and Converse, 1993; Goodman and Shah, 1992;
Mohammed, Ferzandi, and Hamilton, 2010; Ren
and Argote, 2011). PSE provides founding teams
with common routines and an organized under-
standing of task and team member knowledge that
aids team members’ information interpretation
and interaction with their environment (Klimoski
and Mohammed, 1994; Walsh, 1995). Drawing
on work in team cognition, we contend that PSE
characteristics reflect the similarity and accuracy
of knowledge held by founding team members
(McIntyre and Foti, 2013), altering the relative
benefits of PSE for new firm performance. We
focus on prior shared industry-specific experience
because it is considered one of the most important
resources for founding teams (Delmar and Shane,
2006; Shane and Stuart, 2002).
Our study contributes to the literature on
founding team characteristics and new venture
performance (Beckman, 2006; Cooper et al., 1994;
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) by providing
a refined view on how knowledge inheritance from
past organizations provides new firms with critical
competitive advantages. We identify boundary
conditions for PSE benefits, and thus, expand
the scope of the observed PSE effects and our
ability to predict PSE-related phenomena. Our
study also speaks to the entrepreneurial spin-off
literature that emphasizes knowledge inherited
from prefounding industry experience (Agarwal
et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2012; Klepper and
Sleeper, 2005). Specifically, we add to a growing
view challenging the general assumption that
knowledge inherited from prefounding experience
is readily transferred to new firms. Our theory and
results are consistent with the view that a team
configuration perspective is best for considering
inherited knowledge, and that individuals may be
constrained in their ability to independently transfer
knowledge across organizations (Ganco, 2013).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Managers become familiar with, and develop
knowledge structures about, causal relationships in
their task environment through experience (Walsh,
1995). This experience shapes their thinking about
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J. (2015)
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the core elements of effectiveness in that environ-
ment (Mathieu et al., 2000), and thus, provides a
cognitive framework for formal analysis, policies,
and actions (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Kiesler
and Sproull, 1982). Importantly, experience in
one setting affects thinking and behaviors when
managers move to a new setting (Phillips, 2005;
Simons and Roberts, 2008). Thus, individual
founding team members each take to their new
firms the experience-based knowledge developed
in their previous jobs.
If team members share experience, they are “dis-
posed to store and process stimuli in similar ways”
(Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994: 431). Numerous
studies show that shared experience generates sim-
ilar knowledge structures (e.g., Liang, Moreland,
and Argote, 1995; Ren and Argote, 2011). There-
fore, all teams develop shared organizational knowl-
edge and approaches to problem solving over time,
but founding teams with PSE inherit a common
basis for collective action because they acquired
their experience in the same information environ-
ment at their former organization (Walsh, 1995).
Although PSE could pertain to various knowl-
edge contents (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993),
we focus on knowledge from industry-specific
experience. New venture research has considered
industry-specific experience (Agarwal et al., 2004;
Chatterji, 2009; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Kor,
2003), but has failed to account for how extensively
founding team members developed their industry
experience in the same organization. Socialization,
adaptation, successes achieved, and lessons learned
at a prior organization align individuals’ knowl-
edge with the industry task environment where
they gained their experience. Industry-specific PSE
thereby provides founding teams with common
understandings of factors affecting task perfor-
mance as well as relationships among the factors
(Mathieu et al., 2000). Founding team members
with PSE hold more similar knowledge structures
about the industry-organization environment
because they share both organizational history and
synchronous industry experience.
PSE and performance
In start-up organizations, founding teams often
constitute the entire organization. As a result,
their actions directly determine firm perfor-
mance (Ucbasaran et al., 2003). When they have
PSE, the firm should perform better. Shared
experience provides common organizational and
industry-related knowledge as well as under-
standing about each other’s relative strengths
and weaknesses (Lim and Klein, 2006; Mathieu
et al., 2000). The presence of PSE provides an
advantage over firms whose founding teams lack
PSE because teams have a common organizing
framework and routines (Beckman, 2006; Eisen-
hardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Phillips, 2002).
Shared experience reduces information asymmetry
among founders, lowering uncertainty (Becker,
2004). Teams with PSE ought to apply their
experience-based knowledge more readily and
effectively (Reagans, Argote, and Brooks, 2005).
Prior studies examined PSE and performance,
but did not identify conditions that could limit
its benefits. Explanations associated with the
benefits of PSE—shared knowledge and inter-
action routines—mirror mechanisms discussed
in team mental model research (e.g., Klimoski
and Mohammed, 1994), which demonstrates that
the similarity and accuracy of shared knowledge
and routines gained through experience affect the
relative benefit teams accrue (Mohammed et al.,
2010). Capitalizing on conceptual correspondence
between PSE and team mental models,1 we suggest
that similarity and accuracy alter the relative benefit
of PSE to performance. Similarity reflects whether
experiences are alike and overlapping (Edwards
et al., 2006); accuracy reflects whether experiences
adequately “represent a given knowledge domain”
(Edwards et al., 2006: 727). Similarity and accu-
racy are distinct; knowledge structures and routines
can be similar but not accurate, or vice versa (Lim
and Klein, 2006).
Similarity
Founding teams that share similar understandings
of the industry task environment should better
identify problems and allocate resources to solve
them (Edwards et al., 2006), lowering managerial
novelty (Shepherd, Douglas, and Shanley, 2000).
That is, a founding team must have more than
industry-specific experience; the experience must
be organized and readily applicable. If founders
have PSE, they should be able to act promptly.
1 Team mental models are “organized mental representations of
the key elements within a team’s relevant environment that are
shared across team members (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994)”
(Mohammed et al., 2010: 877).
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In contrast, if their experience was obtained inde-
pendently in separate organizations, founders may
disagree about details of the industry environment
and force teams to reconcile idiosyncratic individ-
ual knowledge during the start-up process.
Unless founding teams are wholesale spin-outs
from existing firms, the teams comprise some mem-
bers with shared experience and others with unique
or independent prior experience. At one extreme,
if all team members independently gained their
prefounding experience at different organizations
or at different time points, stark differences could
occur among individuals regarding the core ele-
ments of success in the industry. At the other
extreme, the entire founding teammay have worked
together in the same context for their entire careers
before starting the new firm as may be the case in
a university-based spin-out, where founding team
members think more alike because they all share
similar experience (Rentsch and Klimoski, 2001).
Most teams probably fall somewhere between the
extremes (Huckman, Staats, and Upton, 2009). PSE
therefore varies in “extensiveness,” which increases
as the proportion of members within the team have
longer shared industry-specific experience.
Limited shared experience may be insufficient
to understand underlying principles (Gentner,
Loewenstein, and Thompson, 2003). Longer and
repetitive experience in a task domain may be
necessary for similar knowledge structures to
develop (Lewis, Lange, and Gillis, 2005). As
PSE extensiveness increases, inherited knowledge
will be more familiar and overlapping (Goodman
and Shah, 1992; Harrison et al., 2003). Extensive
PSE increases the similarity of inherited knowl-
edge, shaping expectations and enabling uniform
collective action. Similar knowledge is more
ready-at-hand to benefit new firm performance. We
therefore propose:
Hypothesis 1: New firms with more extensive
PSE will outperform those with less extensive
PSE.
The arguments leading to Hypothesis 1 suggest
that PSE may bring varying benefits to firm per-
formance because founding teams vary in mem-
ber shared history prior to founding. However,
once the entire team begins working together to
lead the new firm, members develop a joint his-
tory (Pisano, 1994). Their “shared team-specific
experience” (Kor, 2003: 709) reflects accumulated
knowledge about one another’s “skills, limitations,
and idiosyncratic habits” (Kor, 2003: 1084). Shared
team-specific experience elevates the shared knowl-
edge the team has about the task as well as about
each other in the current task environment (Good-
man and Shah, 1992). Thus, team-specific expe-
rience represents increasing levels of familiarity
in the team, which supports effective collabora-
tion and interaction (Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin,
1999). The benefits of PSE will yield to the grow-
ing team-specific experience of the entire founding
team based on real-time experience acquired while
leading the new venture. We therefore expect:
Hypothesis 2: The hypothesized relationship
between PSE extensiveness and new firm perfor-
mance will diminish as a founding team accumu-
lates shared operating experience.
Accuracy
Experience is most useful when it provides
valid knowledge for a new task environment
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March,
1993). Differences between the context where
shared experience occurred and where it is applied
affect the accuracy of the inherited knowledge
and may matter more than the benefits of shared
common history (Edwards et al., 2006). If team
members apply knowledge and routines regardless
of their applicability, performance will suffer
(Levitt and March, 1988). Two aspects of shared
industry-specific experience might make the
associated knowledge more or less congruent
with the new firm’s task environment: (1) the
match or mismatch between the new firm and the
within-industry task environment in which the PSE
was acquired; and (2) the gap, if any, between the
period when PSE was acquired and when the new
firm was founded.
Knowledge is setting-specific (Goodman and
Shah, 1992); we must consider the context to under-
stand observed phenomena (Rousseau and Fried,
2001). The knowledge and routines developed in
one context reflect goals, performance require-
ments, and problems relevant to that context (Bran-
don and Hollingshead, 2004). Different industries
have different task environments. For example, the
commercial airline industry has both legacy and
low-cost airlines. Although in the same industry,
their business models, strategies, and task demands
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J. (2015)
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are quite different. If founding members from a
legacy airline try to start a low-cost airline, PSE
might prove detrimental because knowledge and
assumptions may fail to apply to the low-cost airline
task environment. When the industry task environ-
ment of the new firm is materially different from
where PSE was developed, we call it PSE task envi-
ronment mismatch.
If the new organizational context requirements
are similar to the industry task environment where
PSE was acquired, PSE should be more benefi-
cial by providing an accurate model for effective
action in the new firm (Agarwal et al., 2004). Alter-
natively, inaccurate shared knowledge causes erro-
neous judgments, strategic “blind spots” (Edwards
et al., 2006; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), misguided
priorities, and less-effective strategies (Lim and
Klein, 2006). Thus, when PSE is highly extensive,
but task environments are mismatched, teammates
could have very similar but inaccurate ideas about
the task environment requirements for the new firm.
The benefit of founding members’ PSE depends on
whether they gained their shared experience in a
congruent industry task environment to that of the
new organization. PSE benefits are attenuated if the
experience leads to inaccurate priorities and strate-
gies. Thus:
Hypothesis 3: The hypothesized relationship
between PSE extensiveness and new firm per-
formance will diminish as PSE task environment
mismatch increases.
We also expect that a temporal gap betweenwhen
PSEwas obtained and the newfirmwas founded can
affect accuracy. Research typically evaluates inher-
ited knowledge and experience transferred directly
and immediately from one context to another (e.g.,
Ganco, 2013; Lewis et al., 2005), but founders with
PSE could have had intervening independent work
experiences between the time they shared experi-
ence and the time they founded the new firm. As
a hypothetical example: Two founding team mem-
bers worked together at North Star. One left and
moved to Solaris; the other left and moved to Luna.
Three years later, they reconnected and founded
Innovate. Their intervening experiences created a
temporal gap between their PSE and the founding
of the new firm. Industries are dynamic: Strategies,
tactics, customers, and competitors change (Barr,
Stimpert, and Huff, 1992). Shared experience in a
task environment is fixed in time, which could cause
teams to misapply old knowledge and routines
to a new, changed environment (Leonard-Barton,
1992; Levitt and March, 1988). Routines, terminol-
ogy, and narratives become obsolete if not prac-
ticed regularly. When temporal gaps occur, the
old collective experience may fail to match the
demands of the environment at founding. More-
over, the longer people stay in independent envi-
ronments after having shared experience, the more
likely they are individually integrated into differ-
ent business models and environments. Overall,
temporal gaps lower PSE accuracy. As a result,
we expect:
Hypothesis 4: The hypothesized relationship
between PSE extensiveness and new firm perfor-




We tested our hypotheses on a sample of com-
mercial banks chartered in California, Florida,
Minnesota, and Texas between 1996 and 2006. We
identified the top ten states in terms of new bank
founding activity and then selected the four states
from that group based on ease of access to data.
The four states in our sample accounted for almost
half of all new banks established in the United
States during our study period. This research
setting had several desirable features. Establishing
a new bank is an entrepreneurial process through
which founders recognize opportunities, mobilize
resources, and form new organizations (Shane and
Venkataraman, 2000). During the study period,
deregulation inspired competitive dynamics (DeY-
oung, Hunter, and Udell, 2004): a few large banks
acquired thousands of small- to medium-sized
banks, and many seasoned executives founded new
banks in response to emerging opportunities in
underserved local markets (Marquis and Louns-
bury, 2007). The time period we consider was also
advantageous because it was sandwiched between
the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branch Efficiency Act of 1994, which served
to liberalize federal banking rules and increase
interest in the banking sector, and the general
collapse of the banking sector in 2008.
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The founding team data came primarily from
bank charter applications filed with state regulatory
agencies such as the Florida Office of Financial
Regulation and the Texas Department of Banking.
These agencies are responsible for approving new
banks and overseeing the operations of all banks
chartered in their respective states. This excluded
banks filed with national charters that reported to
other regulators such as credit unions. We also
excluded subsidiaries of established banks and new
special purpose banks (e.g., credit card banks)
because they generally neither accept consumer and
commercial deposits nor make traditional consumer
and commercial loans. The exclusions resulted in a
final sample of 344 new banks.
Bank charter applications are publicly available
via Freedom of Information Act data requests, but
we still had to work with regulators to gain access
and collect application documents. In some cases,
we had to visit an office and copy the documents
on the spot. Once we obtained copies of all the
charter applications, we hired research assistants,
blind to the hypotheses, to read the documents and
develop the dataset. An attractive feature of this
sample is that, due to tight regulations, the appli-
cation process required a bank to disclose detailed
biographical information on its founders and busi-
ness plans. As a result, almost all of the data were
taken directly from the charter applications without
modifications or adjustments. For example, infor-
mation such as initial capitalization, the distribution
of equity shares among founders, and the founders’
prior work history are reported on a bank’s char-
ter application documents. Falsification of such
information can have serious repercussions (e.g.,
rejected applications and/or confiscated deposits),
so this research context has minimal risk of incom-
plete or inaccurate information.
Dependent variable
Prior studies on the banking industry have identi-
fied several measures of bank performance. Among
them, return on assets (ROA) is viewed as a concise
and valuable summary statistic of bank performance
(Arshadi and Lawrence, 1987). Expressed as net
income as a percentage of assets, ROA indicates a
bank’s ability to earn profit on its assets, and reflects
how effectively a bank deploys its assets. We col-
lected ROA information from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Once approved by
the regulators, banks may begin operating at any
point during a year. Consequently, performance is
highly volatile during a new bank’s start-up year.
Most new banks, however, stabilize their businesses
by the end of their second year (the first full calen-
dar year), making comparisons of ROA information
across new banks more representative. It is impor-
tant to also note that most banks sustain negative
earnings in their early tenure. This is due to two fac-
tors. First, as a new community entrant, a bank must
establish a reputation before it can attract loans (a
bank’s primary earning assets). Second, in a bank’s
early years, costs are relatively high and limited rev-
enues over which to spread these costs lead to low
early profitability. We therefore measured new bank
performance as a bank’s ROA at the end of its first
full calendar year (e.g., if a bank began operations
in 1999, we used the ROA of 2000).
Independent variables
PSE extensiveness
We measured PSE extensiveness using a relational
approach (Berman, Down, and Hill, 2002; Kor,
2003), considering each dyad of founders identified
from the bank application documents, and calculat-
ing the length of time that each dyad overlapped
in their career histories in the same prior bank-
ing institution. For example, consider this entry:
Founder A “served as President and CEO of Small
State Bank from 1994 until its sale to Big National
Bank in 1997.” Founder B “was CFO and Cashier
of Small State Bank from 1994 until its acquisi-
tion by Big National Bank in 1997.” We captured
the duration of each dyad’s shared experience as
Tij. In the example, this value would be four years
(Founder A and B overlapped in their prior experi-
ence at Small State Bank). We summed all Tij for
all dyads to arrive at a total duration of shared expe-
rience in the team and then divided the sum of Tij
by the total number of dyads in the founding team.
Assuming that our sample founding team above has
only three members—A, B, and C, we then have
three dyads: A–B (four years shared), B–C, and
A–C. The value of the PSE extensiveness variable
is therefore 1.33, or four divided by three. This vari-
able provides a measure of the extensiveness of the
shared industry-specific experience.
Current shared experience
As noted, we used ROA for the first full calendar
year. As a result, teams in our sample had varying
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J. (2015)
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amounts of shared current experience before the
full year of operation, as reflected by the firm age
during the initial operations period prior to the firm
performance measure. To address this, we counted
the number of months that the team operated during
its initial (partial) year as a proxy for its current
shared experience. This variable ranged from 1
(i.e., the team began working together in the prior
December) to 12 (i.e., the team began working
together in the prior January).
PSE task environment mismatch
In our research setting, a bank’s charter indicates
its market scope, product portfolio, and competi-
tive strategy. For example, a bank with a national
charter typically competes nationwide and focuses
on a diversified portfolio of products and services.
In contrast, a bank with a state charter competes
locally and focuses on in-depth relationships with
local businesses (DeYoung et al., 2004). Therefore,
while both contexts may be banking, national and
state banks have important differences in perfor-
mance criteria, goals, and problems. Likewise, reg-
ulatory differences between the charter types may
render knowledge obtained in one context insuffi-
cient or erroneous for the other (Whalen, 2002). To
capture context match or mismatch between where
PSE occurred and the context of the new bank, we
examined the charter type of the new bank and of the
prior bank(s) where founders developed their PSE.
Because a founding team might have more than
one independent PSE group, we continued to use
a dyadic approach to capture PSE context. Specif-
ically, for each dyad of founders with PSE, if the
prior experience occurred in a bank charter type that
did notmatch the new bank’s charter type, we coded
it as 1, and 0 if the charter types matched. We then
summed the values (1 and 0) and divided the sum
by the total number of PSE dyads in the found-
ing team. The value of this variable ranges from
0 (total match) to 1 (total mismatch). Thus, if the
founding team members with PSE all shared their
experience in a bank with a different charter type,
then this variable would be 1. If the subset of found-
ing team members with PSE all shared their experi-
ence in a bank with the same charter type, then this
variable would be 0. Levels between 0 and 1 occur
whenmore than one subgroup of foundingmembers
with prior shared experience were in separate orga-
nizations. For instance, consider a founding team
with five members with some PSE experience. If
two shared their experience in Bank A (charter type
matching the new bank) and the other three shared
their experience in Bank B (different charter type
than the new bank), we have three dyads with mis-
matched values (1s) and one dyad with a matched
value (0). The value of PSE Task Environment Mis-
match would be (3+ 0)/(3+ 1)= 0.75.
PSE temporal gap
This variable refers to the gap, if any, between the
last year in which members worked together and the
year the new bank was established. For each PSE
dyad in a founding team, we recorded the last cal-
endar year of shared experience. Across all dyads,
we took the average of the last calendar year for
the entire PSE cohort. We then took the difference
between the last calendar year of shared experience
for each dyad and the year the new bank was char-
tered, summed these differences, and divided by
the total number of PSE dyads. Thus, this variable
is an overall assessment of the temporal gap (if
any) between the shared industry-specific experi-
ence and the time of founding the new bank. For
example, Bridge Bank, established in 1996, had 11
founders. Seven founders had PSE; five previously
worked for Reliable Bank. Some began their tenure
in early 1985, but all ended in 1995 because the
bank was sold. Two previously worked for Secure
Bank from 1989 to 1991. To calculate the temporal
gap since PSE occurred in this case, we determined
that the five-person PSE group represents 10 sepa-
rate dyads with the last year of shared experience in
1995 (one-year gap) and that the two-person PSE
dyad has a last year of shared experience in 1991
(five-year gap). We averaged these ages to arrive at
a gap since PSE of 1.36 years for Bridge Bank.
Control variables
We included a set of controls based on prior studies
on new venture performance in three categories:
market conditions, resources, and founding team
characteristics.
Founding year
Because banks in our sample were founded over
a decade, we created calendar year dummy vari-
ables to account for unobserved market and policy
changes, such as labor market variations or regula-
tory changes. The omitted year is 1996.
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Founding state
We also included three dummy variables to
account for differences arising from state-level
heterogeneities in our sample. The omitted state is
Minnesota.
Bank prime loan rate
Bank prime loan rate is a key macroeconomic factor
that can affect bank performance. Bank prime loan
rate is based on the Federal Funds rate set by the
Federal Reserve Bank.We collected these data from
Federal Reserve website.
Unemployment rate
We included one conventional indicator of eco-
nomic conditions, unemployment rate, expressed
as the percentage of individuals in the current
work force who are unemployed. We gathered
this information at the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) level from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
Local banking density
A local market characterized by intense competition
can have a detrimental effect on a new bank’s oper-
ations, and substantially hinder profitability (Baum
andMezias, 1992). We included a control measured
by the number of similar financial institutions in the
same geographic region or MSA. We logged this
variable to reduce skewness.
Initial investment capital
Financial services institutions such as commercial
banks are often susceptible to the economies of
scale effect (Bamford et al., 2000). We included
the natural log of the amount of initial investment
capital (in thousands of dollars) with which each
new bank opens as a control variable.
Total banking experience
Banking experience represents knowledge accumu-
lated from years of operations and learning. To cal-
culate this variable, we summed the total number of
years of prior banking experience for each founder.
As the distribution of this variable is also skewed
across new banks, we used its natural log.
Founding team size
Prior studies have shown that founding team size
can be related to the total knowledge stock available
to the team (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990;
Kor, 2003). So we included this control measured
by the number of founders.
Founding team diversity
In addition to bank managers, new bank founders
can be local business owners and professionals,
such as lawyers. To assess the level of occupational
diversity among founders, we constructed Found-
ing Team Diversity using the occupations of the
founders filed in the bank’s application documents.
The Blau index is computed as 1 – Σpi2, where p
is the proportion of founders in a given occupation
(excluding bankers) and i is the number of occupa-
tions (Harrison and Klein, 2007).
Share distribution
Founding team members may have uneven lev-
els of motivation and incentives related to their
stake in the new venture. Therefore, the distribution
of shares among founders may generate different
incentives for coordination among and contribution
frommembers (Kotha andGeorge, 2012).We coded
share distribution by calculating the standard devi-
ation of each founder’s equity percentage.
Analyses
Our interest was to examine the effects of PSE and
its moderating characteristics on firm performance.
However, some new banks may have higher perfor-
mance not because of higher PSE, but because of
an unobserved variable influencing both PSE and
performance. We then conducted a Hausman test,
which yielded a p value of 0.03, indicating that the
estimates of OLS statistically differ from the poten-
tially consistent estimates of 2SLS (Wooldridge,
2002: 118). To address this potential bias, we
employed an instrumental variables (IV) approach
in our analyses (Bascle, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002).
A challenge, however, arises because of the inter-
action terms for our moderated hypotheses. We
reviewed the literature on how to tackle this issue,
and found no consensus regarding how to imple-
ment an IV approach with interaction terms. From
our consideration of the literature, we identified two
approaches.
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The first IV approach to handle interaction terms
involving an endogenous regressor, which we use
to test our hypotheses, was proposed in a recent
Management Science article (Samila and Sorenson,
2011: 434). In that study, the authors first regressed
the endogenous variable on all excluded IVs and
other controls. They then used the predicted values
of the endogenous variable to reconstruct interac-
tion terms and bootstrapped the t statistics 10,000
times in the second stage regression since the stan-
dard errors no longer follow the t distribution. Fol-
lowing this approach, we regressed PSE on two
excluded IVs (described below) and the control
variables. We then constructed interaction terms by
multiplying the predicted values of PSE and the
moderators, and used these terms in the models
to test the hypotheses, with bootstrapped standard
errors.
The second approach is to instrument all the
interaction terms with additional IVs, under the
assumption that an interaction term is another
endogenous variable. The natural IVs for those
interaction terms will be IV(s)×moderator(s). In
our article, this would require eight first-stage IVs
because we have two excluded instruments and four
independent variables (one main effect and three
interaction terms). This approach is not commonly
adopted in empirical studies. Nonetheless, we
implemented this approach and provide a compar-
ison of the results from the two methods in our
results section.
We identified two instruments to employ in our
analyses. The first instrument is prior mergers or
acquisitions (M&A), operationalized as the number
of founders whose prior banks experienced amerger
or acquisition prior to the founding of the new
bank. The second instrument is the number of new
banks founded in the same geographic region in the
previous year, including nonstate chartered banks.
The two instruments provide two different mecha-
nisms for PSE. First, significant corporate behaviors
such as M&A often invoke executive turnover. As
a result, prior M&A increases the likelihood that
sets of familiar managers leave a particular bank at
the same time to look for new opportunities (Deo-
gun, 1996). Second, the number of prior foundings
indicates market opportunities for potential bank
entrepreneurs (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Wu
and Knott, 2006). As a result, a combination of
these two variables increases the possibility that a
group of familiar bank managers leave to start their
own bank. On the other hand, no studies on new
bank performance have suggested that these two
instruments are correlated with PSE. Indeed, when
we regressed ROA on the two instruments, neither
showed a significant relationship with performance.
Following convention, we performed additional
tests to further assess the quality of the instru-
ments. The first-stage regression of PSE on the
two excluded instruments yielded an F-statistic of
14.69 (p< 0.05); the coefficients for Prior M&A
and Prior Foundings were both significant at 0.05
level, together suggesting strong instruments (Bas-
cle, 2008; Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). Further-
more, the Hansen J statistic was 1.25 (p> 0.26),
indicating exogeneity of the instruments. Last, we
also produced OLS estimates (Table 2), as is cus-
tomary, to provide a basis of comparison.
RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics and
correlations. The correlations revealed several
notable relationships. For example, PSE exten-
siveness was positively and significantly related
to first year ROA (r= 0.18, p< 0.05), and current
shared experience was also positively and signifi-
cantly related to performance (r= 0.47, p< 0.01).
Unemployment rate and share distribution among
the founding team members were both negatively
correlated with performance (r= -0.14, p< 0.05;
r=−0.15, p< 0.05, respectively).
Table 2 presents theOLS estimates of our hypoth-
esized PSE effects, while Table 3 presents the IV
estimates. We will primarily focus on the IV esti-
mates, or Table 3, since it alleviates the endogeneity
concern. Hypothesis 1 stated that PSE extensiveness
is positively associated with new bank performance.
Model 1 of Table 3 reveals a positive and signif-
icant relationship between the instrumented PSE
extensiveness and new bank performance (b= 0.37,
p< 0.05). Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. This
finding has important economic implications: For a
new bank with total assets of 100million dollar, a
one standard deviation increase in PSE extensive-
ness roughly increases the new bank’s first year
ROA by 37 basis points (or 0.37%), a substantial
increase given that the mean ROA of our sample
banks is just −1.19 percent.
Hypothesis 2 stated that current experience
moderates the relationship between PSE exten-
siveness and firm performance such that as current
team-specific experience increases, the positive
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Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included
California −1.01** −0.68* −1.01** −0.94** −0.59*
(−2.97) (−2.25) (−2.98) (−2.73) (−1.97)
Florida −0.81+ −0.39 −0.83+ −0.71 −0.28
(−1.73) (−0.93) (−1.78) (−1.52) (−0.69)
Texas −0.33 −0.14 −0.26 −0.27 −0.00
(−0.75) (−0.37) (−0.58) (−0.62) (−0.00)
Bank prime loan rate −0.00 −0.03 −0.01 −0.00 −0.03
(−0.03) (−0.57) (−0.17) (−0.07) (−0.72)
Local banking density −0.17* −0.07 −0.19* −0.18* −0.09
(−2.22) (−1.02) (−2.45) (−2.26) (−1.24)
Unemployment rate −0.23*** −0.18*** −0.22*** −0.22*** −0.17***
(−4.42) (−3.91) (−4.34) (−4.43) (−3.83)
Initial investment capital 0.24 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.11
(1.62) (1.09) (1.45) (1.59) (0.86)
Total banking experience 0.28+ 0.26+ 0.29+ 0.30+ 0.29*
(1.70) (1.79) (1.80) (1.86) (1.99)
Founding team size −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.04 −0.03
(−0.79) (−0.80) (−0.60) (−1.02) (−0.82)
Founding team diversity −0.95 −1.50 −0.87 −0.97 −1.50
(−0.87) (−1.54) (−0.80) (−0.89) (−1.56)
Share distribution −0.07** −0.05** −0.07** −0.07*** −0.05**
(−3.23) (−2.65) (−3.28) (−3.42) (−2.82)
PSE extensiveness 0.11* 0.11* 0.16** 0.11* 0.16***
(2.25) (2.43) (3.02) (2.27) (3.37)




















Observations 344 344 344 344 344
R2 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.25 0.45
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.10, two−tailed tests; z scores in parentheses.
relationship between PSE extensiveness and perfor-
mance declines. The coefficient of the instrumented
interaction term was negative and significant
when entered alone (b=−0.06, p< 0.01; Model
2 of Table 3) and also when included in the full
model with all the interaction terms (b=−0.05,
p< 0.05; Model 5 of Table 3), lending support to
Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 proposed that PSE task environ-
ment mismatch interacts with PSE extensiveness
such that the expected positive relationship
between PSE extensiveness and performance will
be lower in teams with greater PSE mismatch.
The instrumented interaction term is negative and
significant both when entered alone (b=−0.90,
p< 0.10; Model 3 of Table 3) and when included
in the full model containing all the instrumented
interaction terms (b=−0.90, p< 0.05; Model 5 of
Table 3). Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported too.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggested that as the PSE
temporal gap increases, the positive relationship
between PSE extensiveness and performance
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Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included
California −1.09** −0.73* −1.06** −1.06** −0.68
(−2.98) (−2.12) (−3.01) (−3.08) (−1.61)
Florida −0.93+ −0.46 −0.92+ −0.90* −0.41
(−1.87) (−1.02) (−1.77) (−1.97) (−0.69)
Texas −0.26 0.07 −0.11 −0.24 0.18
(−0.55) (0.14) (−0.26) (−0.52) (0.38)
Bank prime loan rate 2.08 2.16 1.61 2.72+ 2.01
(1.40) (1.14) (1.08) (1.71) (1.39)
Local banking density −0.19* −0.09 −0.21* −0.20** −0.11
(−2.39) (−1.13) (−2.43) (−3.08) (−1.38)
Unemployment rate −0.19*** −0.15* −0.18* −0.18** −0.14*
(−3.59) (−2.50) (−2.39) (−2.67) (−2.47)
Initial investment capital 0.64*** 0.51** 0.58*** 0.63*** 0.44**
(3.66) (2.97) (3.64) (3.88) (3.19)
Total banking experience 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.18
(0.80) (0.53) (0.92) (1.26) (0.96)
Founding team size 0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.01 0.01
(0.31) (0.33) (0.36) (−0.11) (0.25)
Founding team diversity −0.78 −1.01 −0.77 −0.89 −1.23
(−0.70) (−0.77) (−0.79) (−0.82) (−1.20)
Share distribution −0.07** −0.06* −0.07** −0.07* −0.06*
(−3.24) (−2.47) (−2.75) (−2.48) (−2.36)
PSE extensivenessa 0.37* 0.42* 0.42* 0.31* 0.40*
(2.32) (2.26) (2.37) (1.98) (2.19)
Current shared experience 0.20*** 0.20***
(9.58) (8.17)
PSE extensiveness× current shared experience −0.06** −0.05*
(−2.63) (−2.42)
PSE task environment mismatch −1.06** −0.69*
(−3.03) (−2.26)
PSE extensiveness×PSE task environment mismatch −0.90+ −0.90*
(−1.91) (−2.03)
PSE temporal gap −0.02 −0.02
(−1.09) (−1.42)
PSE extensiveness×PSE temporal gap −0.02 −0.02
(1.57) (1.10)
Observations 344 344 344 344 344
R2 0.17 0.33 0.19 0.21 0.40
a Instrumented.
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.10, two-tailed tests; bootstrapped z-scores in parentheses.
declines. The estimate for the instrumented interac-
tion term between temporal gap and extensiveness
was negative, but not significant both when entered
alone (b=−0.02, p> 0.10; Model 4 of Table 3)
and in the full model (b=−0.02, p> 0.10; Model 5
of Table 3). Although the OLS estimates show
a significant interaction between PSE and the
temporal gap (b=−0.02, p<−0.05; Model 5 of
Table 2), the IV estimates seem to suggest that such
effect is less significant, thus providing only mixed
support for Hypothesis 4.
Split sample tests
We conducted a series of subsample comparison
tests by dividing the sample into four quadrants and
creating four dummy variables indicating the four
possible combinations for each interaction term
(i.e., high PSE/high moderator, high PSE/low mod-
erator, low PSE/high moderator, and low PSE/low
moderator). To be compatible with our IV approach,
we used the predicted values of PSE to split the
sample. We treated the zero-PSE subsample as the
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Observations 344 344 344
R2 0.34 0.23 0.23
a Use predicted values of PSE to split the sample.
***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.10, two-tailed tests; z
scores in parentheses.
baseline or the omitted group. So the coefficients for
the four subsample dummies will indicate whether
a specific PSE quadrant performs better (or worse)
than the zero-PSE subsample. These split sample
analyses allowed us to more accurately evaluate the
boundary conditions of the PSE effect.2 Table 4
shows results revealing additional insights into the
relative benefits of PSE.
First, we considered current shared experience.
In this analysis, two subgroups showed superior
performance to banks with no PSE: (1) high
PSE and high current shared experience (b= 1.22,
p< 0.001), and (2) low PSE and high current shared
experience (b= 0.98, p< 0.001). These findings
suggest that while current team shared experience
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this valuable suggestion.
overshadows PSE, it is more valuable to teams with
at least some PSE than to teams with no PSE.
Next, we considered task environment mis-
match. Here, only the subgroup of banks with high
PSE/low mismatch performed better than banks
without PSE (b= 0.68, p< 0.05). An important
insight from this is that when banks have high but
mismatched PSE, they perform no better than banks
without PSE. While we found no case where banks
with PSE performed worse than teams without
PSE, these results suggest that PSE benefits may
occur only when the PSE was developed in a task
environment similar to the environment of the new
organization.
Finally, we considered the moderating effect of
PSE temporal gap. Here, we found that both the
High PSE/Low Temporal Gap and High PSE/High
Temporal Gap combinations perform better than the
zero-PSE subsample (b= 0.48, p< 0.10; b= 0.51,
p< 0.05). These results suggest that banks with
high PSE, regardless of a temporal gap, outperform
banks without PSE, and that a temporal gap is more
problematic for teams with lower PSE.
Robustness tests
We conducted several tests to further assess the
robustness of our key findings. First, we tested
alternative specifications of our dependent variable.
For instance, we used the average of three calen-
dar years’ ROA as an alternative to the first full
calendar year. As our theory suggests, the more
new ventures develop their own experience, the less
the impact of founding conditions such as PSE.
Consistent with this prediction, the PSE effect, as
well as its boundary conditions, largely holds, with
some loss of statistical significance. For example,
PSE still exerts a positive and significant impact
(b= 0.23, p< 0.05) on the new dependent variable.
We also replaced local banking density with the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), operational-
ized as the distribution of deposits across banks in
the same region. The HHI influences bank perfor-
mance, particularly in highly concentrated regions
(Dick, 2007). Our results were robust to this alter-
native control. To evaluate whether our results were
sensitive to extreme cases, we excluded outliers in
key variables (e.g., founding team size, PSE exten-
siveness, and PSE temporal gap). We found similar
results after these exclusions.
Finally, in the analyses section we described
an alternative instrumental variable approach for
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cases with interaction terms constructed involv-
ing an endogenous regressor. For comparison, we
implemented this approach with ivreg2 command
in STATA 13. The estimates produced by this
approach are slightly weaker, but compatible with
those presented in the results section. However, we
found evidence of weak instruments in the first stage
(i.e., the CD Wald F statistic is lower than the
Stock Yogo 10% critical value) (Stock et al., 2002),
so we re-estimated the parameters with limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML), which
is robust to weak instruments, and therefore, pro-
duces more trustworthy estimates (Baum, Schaffer,
and Stillman, 2007: 478). This was done using the
LIML option of ivreg2 in STATA (Bascle, 2008:
298–301). The LIMLmodels produced similar esti-
mates to the 2SLS results. Complete results for
the instrumented interaction terms approach using
2SLS and LIML, along with the first-stage regres-
sion results for both models are available in Tables
S1–S3.
For comparison, we present the coefficients
and significance levels for our hypotheses tests
across the estimation approaches in Table 5. By
cross-checking estimates generated by different
specifications, our key findings hold. For example,
regardless of the IV approach, the main PSE effect
is positive and significant in most models. This
effect is inflated in instrumented estimations as
compared to in OLS estimations, largely because
of the inflated standard errors (Wooldridge, 2002).
Finally, the approach in our results section makes
sense because our interaction terms are not non-
linear functions of the endogenous variables
(Wooldridge, 2002: 236), but rather products of the
endogenous variable and moderators. Since these
moderators are used in the first stage regression
to project PSE, the linear projection of interaction
terms would be the same as the interaction of fitted
value of PSE and moderators. Statistically, this can
be shown by the property of conditional expectation
that E(y× z|z)=E(y|z)× z. The interaction terms
therefore do not introduce endogeneity beyond
what’s embedded in PSE.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurs’ prefounding industry experi-
ence is central to founding team research and
entrepreneurial practices. Extant studies on found-
ing teams, however, often assume that individuals
can readily transfer their prior industry experi-
ence to new firms, even if founders gained their
experience independently. Nevertheless, recent
research suggests that individual knowledge
inherited from prefounding experience may be
difficult to integrate and transform into competitive
advantages. Drawing on team mental model theory,
we propose that PSE characteristics are related to
similarity and accuracy in founding team members’
inherited knowledge. We empirically examine
the PSE benefit and its boundary conditions in
a setting of newly founded banks in four states
of the United States. Our results contribute to
and extend theory about founding teams and new
firm performance, and offer new avenues for
future research.
Theoretical implications
Our study extends research on the impact of
founding team characteristics on new venture
performance (Beckman, 2006; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1990; Roure and Keeley, 1990).
Drawing on a distinction made in the team mental
model literature, we identified two dimensions of
PSE that should be considered to assess its potential
benefit: similarity and accuracy (Mohammed et al.,
2010). Considering similarity highlights aspects of
PSE that explain its benefit. Specifically, the finding
that PSE extensiveness is positively associated with
firm performance challenges existing studies that
examine founder prior experience nominally or
additively, and suggests that those studies may be
capturing only a part of the prefounding experience
story. Future research should account for distinc-
tions between independent and shared experience
in evaluating the impact of experience on new firm
performance.
Our findings also enrich the entrepreneurial
learning literature. Given the challenges new firms
face in their early existence, PSE is an important
founding team characteristic for researchers to
include in studies examining initial performance
differences in new firms. Yet, our finding for the
moderating effect of current shared experience
shows that the PSE effect can quickly give way to
current shared experience such that the benefits
of PSE are likely seen early on (Harrison et al.,
2003). This suggests that it is important for future
research to explore the duration of the benefits
of inherited knowledge or congenital learning.
Even so, Beckman and her colleague (Beckman
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Table 5. Comparing coefficients across estimation approaches
Key predictors OLS
Instrumented
PSE with two IVs Two SLS with eight IVs LIML with eight IVs
PSE 0.16** 0.40* 0.38+ (p= 0.053) 0.41+ (p= 0.06)
PSE× current −0.03* −0.05* −0.05* −0.06*
PSE×mismatch −0.51* −0.90* −0.95* −0.97*
PSE×Temporal gap −0.02* −0.02, n.s. 0. 00, n.s. 0.00, n.s.
**p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; †p< 0.10; n.s. p> 0.1; two-tailed tests; z scores in parentheses.
and Burton, 2008) concluded that the background
of founders demonstrates a path-dependent effect
on the evolution of founding team composition,
which is consistent with our split sample finding
that teams with any PSE continue to outperform
teams without PSE as current shared experience
increases. As such, founders’ common prior affil-
iation may exert intriguing effects on new venture
performance.
Finally, our study contributes complementary
insights to the entrepreneurial spin-off literature.
The core argument in this literature is that founders
of new firms often inherit valuable industry knowl-
edge from their past working experience, and there-
fore, gain competitive advantages over startups
without such experience (Agarwal et al., 2004;
Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). Some studies have
shown that those spin-offs not only perform bet-
ter than de novo startups, but in some industries,
even hurt the performance of their past employers
(Campbell et al., 2012). That said, how exactly the
founders inherit or exploit knowledge from their
prefounding industry experience is not well the-
orized. As a result, we are left with a simplistic
account, which suggests that the more prefounding
industry experience, the better. Our results that PSE
task environment mismatch reduces the PSE effect
suggest that under some circumstances a founding
team may inherit inappropriate knowledge. The
split sample results showed that, in some cases,
accuracy-reducing PSE characteristics, such as mis-
matched task environment or temporal gap, render
teams with PSE no better off than those without.
These results show that we are far from concluding
that more PSE is better, or that PSE is always better
than unshared experience.While we did not observe
that low accuracy damaged firm performance, or
made teams with PSE worse than teams without,
future research should consider other industry set-
tings and other characteristics of shared inherited
knowledge to explore this possibility.
Practical implications
Broadly speaking, external stakeholders of new
ventures, such as venture capitalists, must pay
careful attention to founding team characteristics.
Founding teams are widely believed to bring
diverse skills and knowledge that benefit new firms
(Cooper et al., 1994; Delmar and Shane, 2006).
Yet, qualities of their prefounding experience may
determine whether they can utilize the stock of
skills and knowledge. If the knowledge gained
from the shared experience is compatible with
the novel task environment, PSE could be the
integrating force that releases the potential. In
contrast, erroneous routines could render PSE less
beneficial or even harmful.
With respect to banking, regulators have long
considered PSE among founders of new banks to
be of unequivocal benefit. Bank policies governing
new bank formation reflect this belief. For example,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), the primary federal regulator that oversees
national banks, provided a streamlined application
process for new bank founding teams when amajor-
ity of their members exhibited prior banking expe-
rience and cohesiveness. The agency considered
a founding team to be “cohesive” if most of its
members had been associated with one another for
three or more years as directors or officers at the
same satisfactorily performing, federally insured
financial institution (Comptroller’s CorporateMan-
ual). Our results suggest that this regulatory pol-
icy should strongly consider the type of institution
where the banking experience was acquired.
Beyond PSE, our results reveal interesting
insights into contributors to new bank performance.
For instance, the team’s aggregate banking expe-
rience is important, but becomes less significant
when PSE extensiveness is considered: Beyond
industry-specific experience, the team must be
able to act on the experience. Furthermore, prior
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founding experience did little to boost new bank
performance. Share distribution among founders
was consistently and negatively related to new
bank performance across model specifications.
Future investigations can use these findings to
further inform policy and managerial practices in
the banking industry.
Limitations and future directions
Of course, our study has limitations. First, despite
the benefits of the archival data and our research
design, the theoretical mechanisms through which
PSE influences new firm performance require fur-
ther investigation. Future research should formally
assess how extensively the configuration and con-
text of PSE influences the similarity and accuracy
of inherited knowledge as hypothesized. Another
limitation is that we conducted our empirical tests
within a single industry. Although our research set-
ting has advantages, such as accurate and complete
information on founding teams, the uniqueness of
the banking industry is noteworthy. For example,
heavy regulations may significantly hamper entries
and protect the new banks from failures. Future
research should examine whether the relationships
we observed hold in other industries or across
industries.
CONCLUSION
Our study supports the view that industry-specific
experience of founding team members influences
new venture performance, particularly when found-
ing team members shared that experience. Impor-
tantly, however, our findings provide nuance and
caution to the narrative that prior shared experience
is always beneficial. Shared industry-specific expe-
rience may be more or less beneficial, depending
on its characteristics. Under some circumstances, as
our subgroup analyses revealed, founding team PSE
offers no more benefits for new firms than no found-
ing team PSE: Shared industry-specific experience
is valuable but with limitations.
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